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Abstract: Ascertaining litigation for crimes reaching the dimensions of crimes against humanity 
remains an elusive quest. This is despite the precedents set by post-WWII trials in international 
criminal law and post-conflict justice. Ranging from the contribution of Nuremberg to the 
substantive development of international criminal law, to the philosophical evaluation of legalism 
in post-conflict systems of justice, the persistent significance of the Nuremberg legacy is indeed 
worthy of attention. In this article, the Nuremberg legacy is reexamined from the perspective of 
collective responsibility for mass crimes.  The Nuremberg Judgment is counted as the benchmark 
in international law for the definition and adjudication of individual accountability for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and redefined the nature of legal responsibility. However, 
concurring with Karl Jaspers, I argue that for such crimes, the judgment cannot emanate 
from the courtroom alone. In this vein, the paper revisits theories of collective responsibility 
and culpability. Due to the extensive nature of harm involved in historic injustices, I posit that 
individual responsibility argument waged against historic justice claims carries forward a great 
deficit. Historic injustices and the harms they generate are best understood as collective harms. 
The response to such harms must have a collective component as well, and the remedies offered 
are only meaningful in a social and political context. One common form of such harm, constitutive 
harm, significantly differs from the aggregative accounts of harm generally used by standard 
* The author wishes to thank Professor Carl Ehrlich for introducing her to Karl Jaspers’ thought and 
sharing his late father Professor Leonard Ehrlich’s pathfinder work on Jaspers, who was a student 
of the philosopher himself, with great generosity. 
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individual criminal litigation processes. It is the type of harm that people suffer as members of 
historically wronged groups and communities and often in the hands of the state that was poised 
to protect them. Therefore, historic injustice cases require a different account of responsibility, 
one that cannot be harnessed solely based on individual responsibility argumentation within 
the context of domestic or international criminal justice jurisprudence. The article urges that we 
make room for considerations pertaining to collective responsibility as a moral obligation, thus 
providing a context within which legal judgment for egregious crimes could be firmly situated 
and historicized.
Keywords: Collective responsability; International criminal Law; Historical injustices; Collective 
harms; Moral obligation.
Resumo: Estabelecendo litigância por crimes que atingem as dimensões de crimes contra a huma-
nidade continua sendo uma missão evasiva. Isto ocorre apesar dos precedentes estabelecidos pelos 
julgamentos pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial no direito penal internacional e na justiça pós-conflito. 
Variando da contribuição de Nuremberg para o desenvolvimento substantivo do direito penal inter-
nacional, para a avaliação filosófica do legalismo em sistemas de justiça pós-conflito, o significado 
persistente do legado de Nuremberga é realmente digno de atenção. Neste artigo, o legado de Nu-
remberga é reexaminado a partir da perspectiva da responsabilidade coletiva por crimes de massa. 
O julgamento de Nuremberga é considerado referência no direito internacional para a definição e 
adjudicação da responsabilidade individual por crimes de guerra e crimes contra a humanidade e 
redefiniu a natureza da responsabilidade legal. No entanto, concordando com Karl Jaspers, argu-
mento que, para tais crimes, o julgamento não pode emanar apenas do tribunal. Nesse sentido, o 
artigo revisa teorias de responsabilidade coletiva e culpabilidade. Devido à extensa natureza dos 
danos envolvidos em injustiças históricas, considero que o argumento da responsabilidade indivi-
dual contra reivindicações históricas de justiça traz um grande déficit. As injustiças históricas e 
os danos que geram são melhor entendidos como danos coletivos. A resposta a tais danos também 
deve ter um componente coletivo, e os remédios oferecidos só são significativos em um contexto 
social e político. Uma forma comum de tais danos, o dano constitutivo, difere significativamente 
dos relatos agregadas de danos geralmente utilizados pelos processos individuais padrões de liti-
gância criminal. É o tipo de dano que as pessoas sofrem como membros de grupos e comunidades 
historicamente injustiçados e muitas vezes nas mãos do Estado que foi preparado para protegê-
-los. Portanto, os casos de injustiça histórica requerem uma responsabilidade diferenciada, que 
não pode ser aproveitada exclusivamente com base na argumentação de responsabilidade indivi-
dual no contexto da jurisprudência de justiça penal nacional ou internacional. O artigo insiste em 
que demos lugar a considerações relativas à responsabilidade coletiva como uma obrigação moral, 
fornecendo, assim, um contexto dentro do qual o julgamento legal para crimes atrozes possam ser 
firmemente situados e historicizados.
Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade coletiva; Direito criminal internacional; Injustiças históricas; Da-
nos coletivos; Obrigação moral.
SUMÁRIO: 1. Introduction. 2. Beyond Eichmann: on the necessity of judgment. 
3. Towards an engaged theory of judgment and collective responsibility. 4. 
Collective responsibility and legal judgment in international law: the jaspers 
alternative? 5. Moral responsibility as an epicurian cure for the conundrums 
of international criminal law? 6. Collective responsibility and the distribution 
of blameworthiness. 7. Conclusion: the dilemma of the sum total versus its 
constitutive parts.
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ad auctores reddit sceleris coacti culpa –the guilt of imposed 
crimes lies on those who impose them.
Seneca.1
cavendum est ne major poena, quam culpa, sit--care should be 
taken in all cases, that the punishment not exceed the guilt.
Cicero.2 
1. INTRODUCTION
If only we would abide by the ethical guidelines offered by the Romans, 
problematic aspects of collective responsibility in law and legal morality could 
perhaps be successfully avoided. However, a harmonious relationship between 
social life and political peace is not so easy to attain or sustain during deep crises 
and mass violence in our current era. Issues pertaining to justice and personal 
desert at times of turmoil and uproar such as genocidal violence, ethnic cleansing 
or crimes against humanity cannot be reduced to that of proven links between 
punishable individual actions and responsibility-cum-accountability. Intricacies 
of mass political violence and societal crimes render such direct and methodical 
solution inapplicable or lacking. 
How far are our lives implicated by what other people do to each other 
indirectly? How much responsibility falls on our shoulders by the harms that 
flow from social, economic, and political institutions that we are embedded in 
even if we do not inflict harm while occupying positions of authority? Do our 
relations as individuals to spheres of collective existence lead to complicity and 
collective responsibility in the event that they lead to harm for select sectors 
of the society?3 Indeed, the relationship between collective responsibility and 
individual guilt or accountability is a very critical albeit difficult one, often avoided 
1 See the Latin-English dictionary Eudict online at http://www.eudict.com/?lang=lateng&wor-
d=ad%20auctores%20redit%20sceleris%20coacti%20culpa [21.03.2017] For the full text of 
Seneca’s work on Melancholy from which this quote comes, see http://www.gutenberg.org/fi-
les/10800/10800-h/ampart1.html [21.03.2017]. 2 For the translations, see Eudict at http://www.eudict.com/?lang=lateng&word=cavendum%20
est%20ne%20major%20pœna,%20quam%20culpa,%20sit;%20et%20ne%20iisdem%20de%20
causis%20alii%20plectantur,%20alii%20ne%20appellentur%20quidem [21.03.2017]. 
3 As Christopher Kutz’ work shows, the two prevailing theories of moral philosophy, Kantianism 
and consequentialism, both have difficulties resolving problems concerning complicity in collec-
tive violence.  See Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). Also see the classical work of Andrew Arato, “The Bush Tribunals and the 
Specter of Dictatorship” (2002) 9 Constellations 457.
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entirely in international criminal law. It provides a precious point of entry to the 
nature of our relations with the society and the state, which we are a part of and 
for which we are the harbingers of legitimacy.  In this article, I posit that legal 
scholarship needs a richer theory of accountability in which our understanding 
of individual responsibility in relation to societal acts of violence not only allows 
for but demands an analysis of collective action. Here, I will argue that what 
should be sought after is not more complicated punishment schemes but rather 
a substantive way of addressing harm we give to each other both by commission 
and by omission.4 In this context, intentional and purposeful collective action, 
collective moral responsibility and collective guilt, individual responsibility for 
(and in) collective wrongs, collective legal obligations to victims of societal and 
political crimes, and individual moral responsibility with regard to wrongful 
social and political acts constitute key entries for having a meaningful politico-
legal debate on collective responsibility and legal judgment. 
In the following pages, I will pursue these questions in a context originally 
set by Hannah Arendt’s work on legal judgment. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, her 
account of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt used the phrase “the banality 
of evil,” describing how a man who was neither a monster nor a demon could 
nevertheless be an agent of the most extreme and evil acts of violence and 
destruction.5 This subsequently prompted her to readdress fundamental 
questions and concerns about the nature of [collective] violence and our making 
of moral choices. Indeed to be seen as a sequel to her work on Eichmann in that 
regard, her Responsibility and Judgment gathers together unpublished writings 
from the last decade of Arendt’s life.6 In these later works, she strived to explicate 
the meaning of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem much further. At the heart of this 
series of essays lies a profound ethical investigation concerning traditional moral 
4 On this issue, see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account. (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007). May’s work is the first book-length treatment of the philosophical foundations of 
international criminal law. His focus is on the moral, legal, and political questions that arise when 
individuals who commit collective crimes, such as crimes against humanity, are held accountable 
by international criminal tribunals. These tribunals challenge one of the most sacred prerogatives 
of states - sovereignty -. Breaches to this sovereignty can be justified only in limited circumstanc-
es, which constitutes minimalist threshold of the justification for international prosecution. May’s 
work begins an important discussion inside the field of international criminal law. What I purport 
here is to carry this discussion forward in conjunction with moral theories of judgment in applied 
legal philosophy and legal ethics.
5 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Penguin, 1963). Also see Jacob Robinson, And the 
Crooked Shall Be Made Straight the Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Catastrophe, and Hannah Arendt’s 
Narrative (MacMillan, 1965), and, Seyla Benhabib, “Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem” in Dana Rich-
ard Villa, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 
65-85. 
6 See Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (Schocken Books, 2003). 
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truths being used as politico-legal standards to judge criminality pertaining to 
mass violence. 
Arendt’s analysis on judgment tests our ability to distinguish good from evil 
and right from wrong to its limits.  The radical evil she had addressed in her 
earlier work on totalitarianism evolves into her work on a much more pernicious 
evil, almost independent of political ideology, whose execution is limitless when 
the perpetrator feels no remorse and can erase the memory of his/her acts as 
soon as they are committed. For such acts, individual criminal responsibility, even 
if it comes tied to mass crimes such as crimes against humanity, does not suffice 
for us to understand the true nature of the harm and wrong implicated by such 
criminal acts. Arendt’s conclusion has serious repercussions for contemporary 
conceptions of accountability at the level of international criminal law and this 
article is a token of dedication to think further in that vein.  
Individual autonomy is an ideal that refers to the capacity to be one’s own 
person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as 
one’s own and not the product of manipulative, coercive or distorting external 
forces. It is the central value in the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy but it 
is also given fundamental status in John Stuart Mill’s and his successors version 
of utilitarian liberalism. Examination of the concept of autonomy also figures 
centrally in debates over legal freedoms and rights (such as freedom of speech 
and the right to privacy), as well as moral and political theory pertaining to 
justice.7 In the realm of moral theory, seeing autonomy as a foundational value 
stands in contrast with alternative frameworks such as ethics of care and ethics 
of virtue. However, those are rarely brought into debates on criminal justice. 
Autonomy has traditionally been thought to connote independence and hence 
prioritizes individual agency in both moral thinking and political decisions. In 
the context of individual autonomy and the banality of evil, however, the existing 
arsenal of concepts we have do not suffice to deal with the massive problem in 
hand, namely, how to understand the weight of individual choices in producing 
such unforgivable forms of societal and mass harm.  
In the following pages, I argue that we have to turn to another concept, one 
that Arendt was not contend with at all, in order to make sense of this conundrum 
7 See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in I. Kant, Ethical Philosophy, James 
W. Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis, IA: Hackett Publishing [1785/1983]) and his Metaphysical Ele-
ments of Justice, John Ladd, ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [1797/1999]); John Stuart Mill, On Lib-
erty, David Spitz, ed. (Norton, [1859/1975]). Also see Joseph Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom 
(Clarendon 1986); Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconcieving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibil-
ities” (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7, and, Ben Coburn, Autonomy and Liberalism 
(Routledge, 2010). 
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of common-place and rule-bound choices made by individuals leading to 
collective forms of violence and societal wrongdoing. This is the concept of 
collective responsibility.8 In legal philosophy, starting with Joel Feinberg’s work, 
this debate has been kept alive like a slowly burning flame always looming at the 
background of questions pertaining to accountability.9 It also received ire from 
many corners as it goes against the basic principle that no one can be responsible, 
in the properly ethical or criminal sense, for the conduct of another and that 
responsibility squarely belongs to the individual. However, the implications of 
this principle are far-reaching and much more damaging than is evident at first, 
and reflecting upon them led at least a small group of scholars and legal thinkers 
to withdraw the assent which they might otherwise accord to this limited and 
strict view of responsibility. In international criminal law, reverting to the 
barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility for litigation purposes is 
considered an absolute derogation of rights, and rightfully. What I am pursuing 
here is something rather different: it is the notion of accountability for atrocities 
as societal responsibility in a distinctively moral and socio-political sense.10
My purpose is not to attribute a diminishing importance to causation in law 
and moral philosophy. In ideal circumstances where harm is not involved, the 
outcome of an act does not and should not effect our assessment of the moral 
quality of the act.  In cases of acts blameworthy due to their resulting in harm 
or near harm, however, should our moral assessment be neutral? Furthermore, 
should we not look elsewhere other than the individual mens rea component for 
criminal acts that require societal endorsement, support and condoning? Should 
larger outcomes never matter in our moral assessment of a person’s individual 
acts? Back in 1968, when D. E. Cooper proposed the thesis that collectives can 
be held responsible in a sense not reducible to the individual responsibility of 
members of the collective. He also stated clearly that it is not moral responsibility 
8 In legal scholarship, the concept was taken up mainly in the context of blameworthiness for 
litigation purposes. The first important intervention in this regard came in the form of the 
suggestion that actions could serve as legitimate bases for blame without objective wrongdoing 
per se. Here, intent is identified as the key. See Jan Narveson, “Collective responsibility” (2002) 6 
The Journal of Ethics 179. 
9 See Joel Feinberg, “Collective responsibility” (1968) 65 The Journal of Philosophy 674. Also see 
Virginia Held, «Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?» (1970) 67 The 
Journal of Philosophy 471. Held’s article was taken up and reevaluated extensively in Stanley Bates, 
«The Responsibility of» Random Collections» (1971) 81 Ethics 343. 10 Starting with Hywel D. Lewis, “Collective responsibility”  (1948) 23 Philosophy 3, the spectrum of 
works to be consulted in this regard include Larry May, Sharing responsibility. (University of Chicago 
Press, 1992); Larry May & Stacey Hoffman, eds. Collective responsibility: Five decades of debate in 
theoretical and applied ethics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992); Angelo Corlett, Collective 
responsibility (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2001), and, Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and law for 
a collective age (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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which is involved in such an askance of accountability.11 I strongly concur 
with Cooper and invite us to revisit the collective responsibility debate at the 
current historical junction of criminal acts, especially those pertaining to civil 
war, military occupation and neo-colonialism, almost all of which prove beyond 
reach of current regime of accountability in international criminal law barring 
universal jurisdiction jurisprudence. We have nothing to loose in the regard, and 
perhaps a lot to gain, by at least temporarily suspending our overdependence 
on legal institutions for finding cures to our societal ills via litigation based on 
individual accountability. 
2. BEYOND EICHMANN: ON THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT 
Half a century ago, while writing Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt 
struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the manifold problems 
we encounter in our attempts to offer legally valid and morally meaningful 
verdicts concerning those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt 
and legally defunct communities.12 No doubt some of Arendt’s conclusions 
concerning Eichmann are equivocal. Her theory of judgment in the Eichmann 
manuscript itself could even suggest that Arendt may have been suffering from 
remaining trapped within a set of Kantian assumptions in her philosophy of 
history, and thus ended up defining the question of freedom to act in a binary 
way.  In contradistinction, proposing that judgment has an antinomical character 
and emphasizing the importance of elements of reason and sense as well as 
11 See the Cooper/Downie debate at David E. Cooper, “Collective responsibility” (1968) 43 
Philosophy 258 and Robert Silcock Downie, «Collective responsibility» (1969) 44 Philosophy 66. 
Also see Howard McGary, «Morality and collective liability» (1986) 20 The Journal of Value 
Inquiry 157. 12 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, supra note 5 and Hannah Arendt, “Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: An exchange of letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt” (1964) 22 
Encounter 51. Commentaries on Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem are generally one of two kinds. The 
first group confronts the historical relevance of Arendt’s observations and attempts to ascertain 
whether her presentation of Eichmann’s trial compliments or corresponds to the reality of the 
incommensurable suffering of the Jewish people during the Second World War. The second variety 
focuses on the meaning of her term `the banality of evil’ by placing Arendt in a long tradition of 
moral and political philosophy concerned with the problem of judging evil and harm.  See, for 
instance, Peg Birmingham, “Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil,” (2003) 18 Hypatia 
80. If one is to read Arendt’s treatise on Eichmann in light of Walter Benjamin’s conceptions of 
history and storytelling, a third route emerges and it becomes clear that Eichmann in Jerusalem 
was not intended to reflect reality objectively.  On the contrary, Arendt aimed at avoiding the cold 
and detached neutrality of historicism, as she calls it the `tradition of sine ira et studio’, the Latin 
term meaning “without anger and fondness” or “without hate and zealousness.”  For Arendt, such 
an approach to Eichmann and the crimes he committed would represent a renunciation of his and 
others’ responsibility for them. See Annabel Herzog, “Reporting and Storytelling: Eichmann in 
Jerusalem as Political Testimony”  (2002) 68 Thesis Eleven 83. 
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circumstance may allow for a better understanding of the collective nature of 
responsibility for societal crimes and freedom to be redefined in this particular 
context.13 In Theodore Adorno’s terms, judgment becomes the very test for the 
limits of agency and autonomy suffered by the potentially free but essentially 
‘unfree subjects’ of modernity.14
Contemporary readers of Eichmann in Jerusalem sometimes cast it as a 
juridical text, due to the fact that presumably it is concerned more with justice 
than politics or ethics. Such juridical readings of Arendt’s treatise on Eichmann 
in particular and crimes against humanity in general, focus attention on what 
Arendt calls the primary challenge of the case—namely, the trial of Eichmann’s 
unprecedented crimes against humanity in a domestic court.15 However, putting 
so much emphasis on the nature of the crimes against humanity legislation leads 
to our failing to attend Arendt’s principled resistance to a juridical response 
in such cases. This is clearly evidenced in her criticism of both procedural and 
substantive aspects of the Jerusalem Court’s ruling. Taking heed from Arendt’s 
resistance to the Court’s approach, here I argue that Eichmann in Jerusalem does 
not authorize a juridical approach to the unprecedented and egregious crimes 
under discussion, namely crimes against humanity. Instead, it leads us to think 
13 For a timely discussion on the presence of ‘ethical’ narratives and images of the Holocaust in 
debates and demonstrations around the recent conflicts in Gaza and the need for a new form 
of foundation for legal reflection, legal judgment and legal justice in the Arendtian tradition of 
rethinking law, see David Seymour, “From Auschwitz to Jerusalem to Gaza: Ethics for the Want of 
Law” (2011) 6 Journal of Global Ethics 205. 
14 During the 1960s, Theodore Adorno became the most prominent challenger of both Karl Popper’s 
philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of existence. The scope of Adorno’s 
influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to 
which he belonged. The thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions 
from Kant onward, and the radicalness of his critique of contemporary Western society remain 
pivotal for any critique of moral claims concerning individual autonomy. It should also be noted 
that for both Adorno and Arendt, a critical reading of Kant’s Third Critique is the indispensable 
means by which it is possible to locate a path pointing beyond the chiasmic structure suggested by 
the tradition of natural history. See Theodore Adorno, Can One Live after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical 
Reader, ed. R. Tiedemann, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Stanford University Press, 2003). Also see 
Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics; Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the 
Frankfurt Institute (Free Press, 1977).
15 In the course of her 1964 interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt stated her distaste for “intellectual 
business” that arose from witnessing the widespread and “relatively voluntary” Gleichshaltung (co-
ordination) of German “intellectuals” with the Nazis in 1933. This raises the following question: 
what does lack of conscientious engagement with one’s own acts--as exemplified by Eichmann-- 
tell us about the relation between reason, judgment and harm? For a select list of critical readings 
on the subject, see Shoshana Felman, “Theatres of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalen, The Eichmann 
Trial and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of Holocaust” (2001) 27 Critical Inquiry 
201; Paul Formosa, “Thinking, Conscience and Acting in the Face of Mass Evil” In Andrew Schaap, 
Danielle Celermajer and Vrasidas Karalis, eds., Power, Judgement and Political Evil: In Conversation 
with Arendt (Ashgate, 2010); Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz & Thomas Keenan, eds. Thinking in 
Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010).   
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about the importance of an ‘agonistic understanding of law.’16 Such a take would 
foreground law’s dependence on political acceptance or contestation of legal 
strictures, maxims and constraints. Especially with the advent of mass crimes 
such as crimes against humanity, Arendt asks us to attend to law’s dependence 
on the human capacity to resist legal compulsions and urges us to redefine 
the meaning and merit of legal institutions in light of the responsibility of all 
concerned for their maintenance, sustenance and functioning.17 
In her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt detranscendentalizes 
Kant by linking Kant’s judgment of taste to empirical sociability and lived 
experience.18 However, she does not confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking 
with an actual dialogue with others. Instead, she introduces the notion of 
interdependence between judgment and speech, or communication. In this 
sense, Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not as a theory of aesthetic 
judgment, but as an answer to the more general question of ‘how do I judge?’ 
She also draws a distinction between common sense and community sense, a 
notion further explored in the work of Jennifer Nedelsky and others writing in 
the area of human rights. Working with the notion of community sense, Arendt 
uncovers a foundation not only for humans as political beings but also for 
the idea of humanity at large. However, this finding is often overlooked in the 
literature pertaining to her theory of judgment.19 In the following pages, I would 
16 See Lida Maxwell, “Towards an Agonistic Understanding of Law: Law and Politics in Hannah 
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem” (2010) 11 Contemporary Political Theory 88. On the issue of 
morality and politics of law concerning Nazi crimes, see Diana Taylor, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment: 
Thinking for Politics” (2002) 10 International Journal of Philosophical Studies 151; Craig Reeves, 
“Exploding the Limits of Law: Judgment and Freedom in Arendt and Adorno”  (2009) 15 Res 
Publica 137; Seyla Benhabib, ed. Politics in Dark Times: Encounters with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).17 The literature on this debate is immense. For a select set of critical readings that concentrates 
precisely on this subject, see Samir (2004) “Writing and Judging: Adorno, Arendt and the Chiasmus 
of Natural History.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 30 (4): 445-475; Parekh, Serena (2008) Hannah 
Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights. Routledge; Gandesha, 
Goldman, Avery (2010) “An Antinomy of Political Judgment: Kant, Arendt and the Role of Purpo-
siveness in Reflective Judgment.” Continental Philosophy Review 43 (3): 331-352; Degryse, Anthony 
(2011) “Sensus Communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt’s Reading of Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (3): 345-358; Villa, Dana (2012) From the 
Critique of Identity to Plurality of Politics: Reconsidering Adorno and Arendt. In Lars Rensmann 
and Samir Gandesha, eds., Arendt and Adorno: Political and Philosophical Investigations. Stanford 
University Press. 18 See Hannah Arendt & Ronald Beiner. Lectures on Kant’s political philosophy (University of Chicago 
Press, 1989). 
19 On this issue, see Ronald Beiner, “Rereading Hannah Arendt’s Kant Lectures” (1997) 23 Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 21; Paul Formosa, “Thiking, Willing, Judging.” (2009) 4 Crossroads 53; Avery 
Goldman, “An Antimony of Political Judgment: Kant, Arendt and the Role of Purposiveness in 
Reflective Judgment” (2010) 43 Continental Philosophy Review 331; Roger Berkowitz & Majid Yar, 
Majid “From Actor to Spectator: Hannah Arendt’s Two Theories of Judgment” (2010) 26 Philosophy 
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like to bring back this sense of political groundedness of collective action vis-à-
vis our notions of collective responsibility and concerns pertaining to criminal 
judgments in this context. 
Of Arendt’s completed works, the ‘Postscriptum’ to Thinking, the first volume 
of The Life of the Mind, and her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy are widely 
considered to be her definitive remarks on judgment. These texts are privileged 
for two reasons. First, they were written after Arendt’s controversial text, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. It was Arendt’s recognition of the role that Eichmann’s 
inability to think played in his war crimes which motivated her to analyze more 
fully not only the ‘human activity’ of thinking, but those of willing, and judging 
as well. In addition, in both The Life of the Mind and the Kant Lectures, Arendt 
treats judgment as a distinct human activity with a unique potential. In these 
later works, though Arendt does indeed reformulate her notion of judgment, she 
does not depoliticize it. On the contrary, the effects of what Arendt refers to as 
‘dark times’ are long-term and pervasive and, moreover, the function of making 
judgments within such an expanded context remains politically germane as it 
was back in the immediate aftermath of WWII. 
Specifically, the basic project of Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy could be identified as an attempt to ground the idea of human dignity 
within the context of the publicly displayed ‘words and deeds’ that constitute the 
realm of human affairs and of course, politics. Her attempt to redefine human 
dignity also involves a strong philosophical response to Plato’s impugning of the 
dignity from the polis. The Kant Lectures bring this distinct philosophical take on 
the political nature of genuine human conduct to its completion: the enactment 
of public deeds presupposes a company of engaged spectators who draw 
meaning by judging what is enacted in the public sphere. In other words, Arendt 
appropriates and reconceptualizes Kant’s work in such a way that judgment, 
while a distinct faculty, nonetheless retains an utmost political character. 
3. TOWARDS AN ENGAGED THEORY OF JUDGMENT AND COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY
The notion of collective responsibility would indeed prove legally and morally 
unsustainable if it is taken to be an unqualified application of the Kantian model 
of individual moral responsibility to the society at large.20  However, it emerges as 
and Social Criticism 1, and, Roger Berkowitz, ed. Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on Ethics 
and Politics (Fordham University Press, 2010). 20 For a strong philosophical critique of the direct application of the Kantian model with reference 
to legal obligations, see David Copp, “What Collectives are: Agency, Individualism and Legal 
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a more coherent phenomenon should we choose to formulate it in terms of moral 
choices leading to willing acts that are above and beyond the singular capacity 
of autonomous individual agents.21 Our desire for accountability against actions 
of groups and institutions that cause harm and injustice in the society at large 
could be at least partially satiated if we allow the lens of collective responsibility 
to refocus our attention from intentionality of harm to the processes pertaining 
to production or possible curtailment of it.22 
In the field of legal theory, the biggest controversy concerning collective 
responsibility is about the method of its attribution. Without grounds for 
ascertaining collective responsibility, received wisdom has it that there is no 
possibility for judgment. Legally speaking, collective responsibility is defined 
mainly in terms of duties to respond to the victims of collective crimes. Therefore, 
it invokes a reverse reading that is heavily situation-bound. Accordingly, 
reasonable fear on the part of the victimized groups and communities creates 
duties to respond that concern members of the perpetrating group or the society 
Theory” (1984) 23 Dialogue 249 and Kendy M. Hess, “Because They Can: The Basis for the Moral 
Obligations of Collectives” (2014) 38 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 203. Philosophers who reject 
rank individualism and a self-interested legal culture tend to reject schisms between legal norms 
and community values, institutionalized separation of law from morals, supremacy of intricate 
regimes of legislation and adjudication over social truths. They also tend to stand against the 
culture of rampant litigation for seeking justice. The alienation of individuals from each other 
and from their communities is so easily bred within highly complex political and legal systems. 
This issue is squarely taken up by communitarian critiques of law in legal theory. See for instance, 
Chantal Mouffe, “Democratic citizenship and the political community” in her Dimensions of radical 
democracy: Pluralism, citizenship, community  (Verso, 1992) at 225-239. 21 On the legal significance of the concept, see Joel Feinberg’s work, especially his Doing and 
deserving; essays in the theory of responsibility, supra note 6. Also see Linda Raznik, “Collective 
Responsibility and Duties to Respond” (2001) 27 Social Theory and Practice 455; Iris Mario Young, 
“Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model” (2006) 23 Social Philosophy and 
Policy 102; Ronald Tinnevelt, “Collective Responsibility, National Peoples and the International 
Order” (2009) 2 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 147, and, Margaret Gilbert, “Shared 
Intention and Personal Intentions” (2009) 144 Philosophical Studies 167. 22 On the issue of ‘communities of judgment’, Jennifer Nedelsky makes a strong argument in support 
of the social foundations of judgment. Nedelsky posits that the debates over ‘universal’ human 
rights versus abuses in the name of culture and tradition are best understood as conflicts between 
different communities of judgment. Using Hannah Arendt’s work on judgment as a starting point, 
she addresses the problems and possibilities that arise out of Arendt’s view that judgment relies 
on a ‘common sense’ shared by members of a community of judging subjects. Nedelsky points out 
that  ‘common sense,’ ‘community’ and ‘other judging subjects,’ are concepts not fully developed 
in Arendt’s theory. This leads to her account of the concept of ‘enlarged mentality’ as the basis for 
human rights. There remains, however, the thorny question of how one could decide to change or 
oppose ‘common sense’ when it seems to be presupposed for judgment to be possible. As we attend 
to concrete manifestation of the problem of judgment across communities, our linked capacities 
for autonomy and judgment emerge as complementary rather than contradictory faculties and 
capacities. Nedelsky’s insights on Arendt’s theory of judgment prove most useful in the context 
of collective responsibility. See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Communities of Judgment and Human Rights” 
(2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 245. 
64 NERGIS CANEFE
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v.3 | n.1 | p. 53 - 89 | jan./jul. 2017
at large. This phenomenological account of collective responsibility may offer 
us a justification for making judgments about collective responsibility that 
are compatible with the separateness and autonomy of persons.  However, it 
still leaves a number of critical questions unattended.  For instance, could we 
defend the claim that collective responsibility can be assigned based on group 
membership? I would argue that this is indeed a dangerously erroneous approach 
to the subject.  For the purpose of examining the nature of legal judgment under 
the strenuous circumstances of egregious crimes, collective responsibility is 
best understood in terms of societal duties to respond to the victims of collective 
crimes rather than attribution of collective guilt and culpability.23
Responsibilities moral agents have in relation to global structural social 
processes with unjust consequences constitute a good case in point. How 
ought moral agents, whether individual or institutional, conceptualize their 
responsibilities in relation to global injustice, for instance, if they do so at all? 
In this case, a model of collective responsibility deriving from global social 
connections and interdependencies may serve the purpose of forming the 
foundation for defining obligations of justice arising from structural social 
processes. As detailed in the work of Iris Marion Young, such a social connection 
model of responsibility dictates that all agents who contribute by their actions 
to the structural processes that produce injustice have responsibilities to work 
to remedy these injustices.24 This is quite different from the standard model 
of responsibility putting emphasis on liability. This alternative model does not 
isolate perpetrators. It also judges background conditions of action as well 
as consequences. It is forward looking and it relies upon the responsibility to 
23 Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties and thus only moral agents could 
be subjected to criminal attribution. This standard places serious constraints on the determination of 
which collectives can bear action-demanding duties or be rendered accountable for societal harm.  It 
is equally erroneous to assume that individual agents can bear duties and full scale of legal obligations 
regarding actions that only a collective could perform. This leaves us at a loss when assigning duties in 
circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective 
exists. It also causes problems concerning attribution of guilt and adjudication of crimes involving 
collectivities. Collectivization of duties and introduction of notions such as ‘public responsibility’ may 
alleviate some of the problem. Specifically, we could define individual duties to take steps towards 
forming a collective sense of responsibility, which then incur a duty over collective and cumulative 
action. However, this problem cannot be so easily overcome at the adjudication of mass crimes and 
attribution of guilt. See Marion Smiley, “From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Rethinking Collective 
Moral Responsibility” (2010) 1 Journal of Law and Policy 171; Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in 
Collective Context (Oxford University Press, 2011), and, Anne Schwenkenbecher, “Joint Duties and 
Global Moral Obligations” (2013) 26 Ratio 310. 
24 See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford University Press, 2011). On the application 
of restitutive justice at a global scale, see Jacob Schiff, “Confronting Political Responsibility: The 
Problem of Acknowledgement” (2008) 23 Hypatia 99; Henning Hahn, “The Global Consequences 
of Participatory Responsibility” (2008) 5 Journal of Global Ethics 43, and, Todd Calder, “Shared 
Responsibilty, Global Structural Injustice and Restitution” (2009) 36 Social Theory and Practice 263.
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be shared. Furthermore, it can be discharged only through collective action. I 
would argue that Marion Young’s social connection model and Arendt’s notion 
of community sense have more in common than at first meets the eye, and this 
is a hopeful overlap for any future discussion on collective responsibility in 
international criminal law. 
If so, in terms of committal of crimes, how could we define the legal 
threshold for determining whether a collective shares the intention to harm a 
select group, which is the distinctive feature of collective as opposed to individual 
responsibility?  There are at least three criteria of adequacy for an account of 
shared criminal intention, namely the disjunction, concurrence, and, obligation 
criterium.25 Accordingly, people share an intention when and only when they are 
jointly committed to intend as a body to commit an act in the future. In other 
words, there is an element of premeditation as well as active participation towards 
the committal of violent act or acts.  The problem is, in the case of societal and 
political crimes, many instances of wrongdoing and violence appear to be of a 
distinctly spontaneous and collective kind without clear signs of premeditation. 
When, for example, one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is 
collective in the sense that the wrongfulness of genocide is morally distinct from 
the aggregation of individual murders that make up the genocidal killings in their 
entirety. And yet, it may not be possible to either prove or indeed to find a clear 
framework for shared intentions for genocide for each of the perpetrators of 
criminal acts. The problem, which I would rephrase as the problem of collective 
wrongdoing, is how to assign blame for distinctly collective acts of violence to 
individual contributors when none of those individual contributors is singularly 
guilty of the Wrongdoing with a capital W in question. 
In such instances, suffice it to say that intention is not merely a private 
mental act known only by the people who express their intentions in public. 
Rather, intention is a communal act, for the fact that observable circumstances 
and consequences determine the justiciability of intention in criminal law. Here, 
Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle provides a good starting point for tackling 
the problem of intentionality in societal and political mass crimes.26 Kutz’s work 
25 See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1998); Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Elisabeth Pacherie, “Framing Joint Action” (2011) 2 Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology 173, and, Darrell Cole, “War and Intention” (2011) 10 Journal of Military Ethics 174.
26 See Christoper Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 
2000). On the issue of collective complicity, also see Larry May, “Complicity: Ethics and Law for a 
Collective Age” (2002) 111 Philosophical Review 483; Garrath Williams, “No Participation without 
Implication: Understanding the Wrongs we do Together” (2002) 8 Res Publica 201; Torbjorn 
Tannsjo, “The Myth of Innocence: On Collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment” (2007) 
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examines the relationship between collective responsibility and individual guilt. 
He presents a rigorous philosophical account of the nature of our relations to social 
groups in which we participate and then links this debate to contemporary moral 
theory. For him, there are two prevailing theories of moral philosophy, Kantianism 
and consequentialism, both of which have difficulties dealing with the issue of 
complicity. For Kutz, similar to Arendt, a richer and more grounded theory of 
accountability demands that our understanding of collective action not only allows 
but calls for redefining individual responsibility in collective settings via complicity.
No doubt Kutz’ principle ought to be expanded in order to link it with the 
legal phenomenon of attribution of collective responsibility. In this context, the 
view I purport is that individuals are blameworthy for collective harms insofar 
as they knowingly participate in those harms, and that said individuals remain 
blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in making a causal contribution 
to those harms.27 In this sense, my argument for collective responsibility is 
36 Philosophical Papers 295; Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Uwe Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability and the Moral Equality of Combatants” 
(2012) 16 Journal of Ethics 339, and, Brian Lawson, “Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing” 
(2013) 16 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice  227. Over the past decade or so political leaders around 
the world have begun to apologize for, and seek reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of 
large-scale moral wrongs such as slavery, past campaigns of ethnic cleansing, and official regimes 
of racial segregation. This movement towards a politics of ‘moral healing’ and the emergence of 
an official regime of requesting forgiveness is in effects at odds with full-fledged reconciliation 
concerning societal wrongs, unless it leads to concrete policies of amelioration, structural change 
and implementation of restorative justice measures. For wrongs caused by state-sanctioned moral 
atrocities, and, requiring mass participation and endorsement, interpersonal reconciliation is not 
likely to be a promising model for providing closure. In this context, Isaacs’ work is particularly 
relevant. She relates intentional collective action to collective moral responsibility, as distinct from 
collective guilt. She also traces the pedigree of individual responsibility for (and in) collective 
wrongs and links collective obligations with individual obligations. The remaining question, at 
least for the criminal law context, pertains to individual moral responsibility and possibilities of 
accountability in wrongful and harmful social and political practices. An interesting case in this 
regard is the matter of combatants discussed by Steinhoff. According to the dominant position 
in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no “moral equality of 
combatants” for criminal justice purposes. In other words, combatants participating in a justified 
war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war. In the meantime, where 
combatants violate the rights of innocent people—known as collateral damage in humanitarian 
law, they are in fact liable to attack by the combatants even on the unjustified side for self-defense. 
That fact on its own gives us a hint about the fluidity of the concepts of liability, culpability and 
accountability even under the most rigid circumstances such as active warfare.  27 In support of my proposition, see Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in 
Plural Subject Theory (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000). One of the most distinguished 
social philosophers of our times, Margaret Gilbert develops her arguments around the notion of 
plural subject theory of human sociality, first introduced in her On Social Facts and Living Together. 
See Margaret Gilbert, Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1996) and her earlier work, On social facts (Princeton University Press, 1992). In 
Sociality and Responsibility, Gilbert then presents an extended discussion of her proposal that 
joint commitments inherently involve obligations and rights, and thus proposes a new theory of 
obligations and rights that deviates from individualistic agency arguments. Presenting political 
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based on contra-factual reasoning.  For instance, if a collective takes no active 
responsibility for the conservation of life and livelihood of all of its members but 
especially ignores those with vulnerabilities, then it is right to presume that there 
emerges collective responsibility for the harm ensued from lack of provision 
for any such required protections.28 This is one way to avoid the problem of 
intentionality that clouded Arendt’s path in terms of identifying wrongdoing that 
is not seen or known as wrongdoing by either the person who commits it or by 
those who condone it. 
At this point, the writings of David Miller on national responsibility, read along 
Karl Jasper’s work on societal responsibility, are of great relevance. Starting with 
Miller, in his work on national responsibility and global justice, he conceptualizes 
and justifies a particular model of national responsibility--a model that may be 
helpful in devising a wholesome approach to collective responsibility in justice 
terms.29 His conceptualization proceeds in two steps.  He starts by developing 
two models of collective responsibility, the like-minded group model and the 
cooperative practice model. He then proceeds to discuss national responsibility 
as a species of collective responsibility, and argues that nations have features 
such that both models of collective responsibility apply to them.  I would argue 
that Miller’s like-minded model does not provide a plausible conceptualization of 
collective responsibility in the politico-legal realm at all as it tends to rely upon 
obligation, collective remorse, collective guilt, shared intention and important classes of rights and 
obligations from a plural subject theory perspective, Gilbert’s work is very relevant to legal scholars 
who engage with the subject of collective responsibility. Also see Margaret Gilbert, “Collective guilt 
and collective guilt feelings” (2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics 115 and her Joint commitment: How we 
make the social world (Oxford University Press, 2015).28 For a strong take on environmental justice and collective responsibility, see Mary Oksanen, 
“Species Extinction and Collective Responsibility” (2007) in The Proceedings of the Twenty-First 
World Congress of Philosophy (Vol. 3 at 179-183). On the issue of what we owe to the world at 
large, David Zoller argues that while it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviors, 
such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a very heavy cost to the global poor, it has proven 
difficult to argue that contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. The problem 
concerning marginal contributions to distant harms stems from lack of explicit knowledge of 
the consequences aforementioned consumers could have born in mind. Critics of this approach 
reasonably argue that distant and inadvertent acts that cause harm provide insufficient grounds 
for moral or legal blame. However, the damage that agents bring about through their contributions 
to distant collective wrongs ultimately depends upon our morally sparse and individualistic take on 
everyday purchases and decisions. In this instance, contributors who knowingly disregard distant 
harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they could have foreseen, 
directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor 
generally suffer. For Zoller, this provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing 
participation in unstructured collective harms. See David Zoller, “Moral Responsibility for Distant 
Collective Harms” (2015) 18 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 995. Also see Bjorn Pettersson, “Co-
responsibility and Causal Involvement” (2013) 41 Philosophia 847.
29 See David Miller, “National responsibility and global justice” (2008) 11 Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 383.
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a bucolic, romanticized notion of a nation as an ethically cohesive unit.30 The 
collective practice model, on the other hand, could provide a strong argument for 
formulating state-based collective responsibility. The standard example used in 
this context is, of course, conceptualization of crimes pertaining to societal and 
political violence when one lived under the Third Reich.31 
In summary, Miller attempts to attribute to nations the kind of responsibility 
that generally vests in states as legal actors. Unfortunately, models of statist legal 
responsibility disregard society’s inner dynamics. In addition, they sanction the 
differences between intrastate and interstate forms of law as irremovable. Miller 
aims to build up the moral and historical prestige of the nation-state to make 
it a viable agent embracing a claim of universal morality. Miller’s nations thus 
become political organizations capable of instantiating great moral truths. This 
results in an account that is compassionately cosmopolitan and yet with very 
little interest in or engagement with local forms of deliverance of justice that 
relate to mass violence either within the state perimeters or globally induced.32
Overall, however, Miller’s work raises a number of interesting questions 
concerning both weak and strong variants of collective responsibility and 
state-centric law.33 For instance, he defends a theory of connections to address 
30 For a critique of Miller’s work, see Roland Pierik, “Collective responsibility and national 
responsibility” (2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 465, and, 
K. Lippert-Rasmussen, “Responsible nations: Miller on national responsibility” (2009) 2 Ethics & 
Global Politics 21. 
31 To reiterate an otherwise well-known historical vignette, Hitler was appointed as the Chancellor 
of Germany by the President of the Weimar Republic Paul von Hindenburg on January 1933. 
The Nazi Party then began to eliminate all political opposition and consolidate its power. By 
1934 Hitler became dictator of Germany by merging the powers and offices of the Chancellery 
and Presidency. This was further entrenched by a national referendum held on 19 August 1934, 
confirming Hitler as the sole Führer (leader) of Germany. Consequently, all power was centralized 
in Hitler’s office, and his word became above all laws. As to be expected, opposition to Hitler’s rule 
was ruthlessly suppressed and members of the liberal, socialist, and communist opposition were 
killed, imprisoned, or exiled. The implementation of the regime’s racial policies culminated in the 
mass murder of Jews and other minorities in the Holocaust. For a detailed account of law during 
the Third Reich, see the historical pieces written and published during the Second World War, K. 
Loewenstein, “Law in the Third Reich” (1936) 45 The Yale Law Journal 716, V. L. Gott, “The National 
Socialist theory of international law” (1938) 32 The American Journal of International Law 704; as 
well as the more recent debates such as D. F. Vagts, “International law in the Third Reich” (1990) 
84 The American Journal of International Law 661; Martin Lippman, “They Shoot Lawyers Don’t 
They: Law in the Third Reich and the Global Threat to the Independence of the Judiciary” (1992) 23 
Cal. W. Int’l LJ 257, and, David Dyzenhaus, “Legal theory in the collapse of Weimar: contemporary 
lessons?” (1997) 91 American Political Science Review 121.
32 See T. J. Levy, “National and statist responsibility” (2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 485 and Margaret Moore, “Global justice, climate change and Miller’s theory 
of responsibility” (2008) 11 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 501.
33 See in particular David Miller, “Collective responsibility and international inequality in the law of 
peoples” In Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (2006) at 191-205.
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remedial responsibilities amongst states.  His interventions on the subject of 
cosmopolitanism in particular endorse a position where states that are causally 
and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may be held 
remedially responsible for their actions.  This is despite the fact that there is no 
international mechanism to ensure that remedially responsible states would offer 
assistance to or accountability for the suffering of effected states and societies, 
other than instances of victor’s justice and imposed war reparations. As such, 
that job squarely falls into the hands of international public law for purposes of 
enforcement. In this regard, Miller’s claims of universal morality as applied to 
international or transnational law are severely idealistic. In contradiction, I would 
argue that we must initiate a kind of deflation of both the nation and the state 
as foundational moral agents. Just as the diminution of responsibility for mass 
crimes from the collective entirely to the individual is faulty, the aggrandizement 
of individual moral agency and accountability to the grandiose entity of the state 
or the construct of the nation as the ultimate truth bearer is equally hyperbolical. 
At this point, as an alternative to cosmopolitan and liberal accounts such 
as Miller’s work, I will examine collective responsibility from an outcomes 
perspective. A central feature of my analysis is to give precision to the idea that 
moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand and possibility that an agent 
should have acted otherwise.  Allocation of moral responsibility to individuals 
concerning complex collective actions that result in mass harm is an issue that 
goes well beyond ‘the problem of many hands’ as exemplified by the classic 
Frankfurt counter-examples.34  Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in 
terms of responsibility for past actions or as a question about the nature of moral 
agency. Yet the word responsibility also ushers in deep concerns about human 
agency, more so than the answers it possibly elicits in legal terms. This latter take 
on responsibility also relates it to civic virtues that can be demonstrated both 
34 Matthew Braham & Martin Van Hees “An anatomy of moral responsibility” (2012) 121 Mind 
601. As discussed in detail by Braham and Van Hees, Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt 
counterexamples) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples 
to the “principle of alternate possibilities”, which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an 
action only if that person could have done otherwise.  Frankfurt infers that a person could still be 
morally responsible for what he has done even if he could not have done otherwise.  Frankfurt’s 
examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behavior even though they lack 
the freedom to act otherwise. Frankfurt thus suggests that we question the fallacy of the notion 
that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. See Harry G. Frankfurt, “Alternate 
possibilities and moral responsibility” (1969) 23 The Journal of Philosophy 829. This line of 
reasoning and debate on responsibility under coercion resurfaced in more recent work such as Jay 
R. Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, 1984); John Martin 
Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), and, Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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by individuals and organizations/institutions. Such a virtue-based account of 
responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the context of discussions on moral 
needs, and moral achievements, of societies, especially for the ones that survived 
mass political violence and trauma. 
This is an opportune moment to bring in Karl Jaspers’ work. When Hitler came 
into power in 1933, Jaspers was taken by some degree of surprise, as he had thought 
that this movement would destroy itself from within, thus leading to a reorganization 
and liberation of other political forces active at the time.35 His expectations did not 
materialize and because his wife was Jewish, Jaspers qualified as an enemy of the 
German state. Consequently, from 1933 onwards, he was excluded from the higher 
councils of the university. In 1935 the first part of his work on logic, entitled Vernunft 
und Existenz (Reason and Existenz, 1955), appeared. This was followed by a book 
on Nietzsche in 1936, an essay on Descartes in 1937; and his Existenzphilosophie 
in 1938.36 Meanwhile, a series of decrees were promulgated against him, including 
removal from his professorship and a total ban on any further publication. These 
measures effectively barred him from living and working in Germany. Permission 
was finally granted to him in 1942 to go to Switzerland, but a condition was imposed 
by the Nazis that required his wife to remain behind in Germany. He decided to stay 
with his wife in Germany. In effect, both of them had decided, in case of an arrest, 
to commit suicide. In 1945 he was told that his deportation was scheduled to take 
place on April 14. On March 30, Heidelberg was occupied by the American forces 
and Jaspers and his wife avoided deportation.
Marked by the events of pre-war years, Jasper’s detailed philosophical 
examination of the contemporary state and nature of humankind titled Man 
in the Modern Age is a seminal work that touches upon precisely the issue of 
our responsibility for our own and others’ future.37 Elucidating his theories on 
a variety of topics pertaining to contemporary and future human existence, the 
volume meditates upon the tension between mass-order and individual human 
life, our present conception of human life and the potential for a better future. 
Jaspers wrote his work before the advent of the Second World War but at a time 
35 See the Karl Jaspers entry of Encyclopedia Britanica by Hans Saner at https://www.britannica.
com/biography/Karl-Jaspers [21.03.2017]. 
36 See Karl Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz, Groningen: Wolters. Translated as, Reason and Existenz, 
trans. W. Earle( New York: Noonday Press, 1955); Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis 
seines Philosophierens, Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated as, Nietzsche: An Introduction to his 
Philosophical Activity, trans. C. F. Wallraff and F. J. Schmitz (University of Arizona Press, 1965) and 
Existenzphilosophie, Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated as, Philosophy of Existence, trans. R. F. Grabau 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
37 See Karl Jaspers, Die Geistige Situation der Zeit, Berlin: de Gruyter. Translated as, Man in the 
Modern Age, trans. E. Paul and C. Paul (London: Routledge, 1933). The original volume in German 
came out in 1931. 
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when Nazi ideology and institutional practices were beginning to run rampant 
in Germany. This work constitutes the departure point for the next section of the 
present debate on collective responsibility. 
Jaspers’ contribution to the literature on collective responsibility took an 
even more pointed form with the publication of the Die Schuldfrage [The Guilt 
Question], which addressed the question of the collective responsibility for the 
German people for the criminal actions of their government.38 In that short treatise, 
Jaspers listed four types of guilt. The first category, criminal guilt, derives from 
violating unequivocal laws and is capable of being determined based on objective 
proof. Its jurisdiction rests with the courts. The second category, political guilt, 
involves the deeds of statesmen and implicates the citizens of a state for having 
to bear the consequences of the deeds of the state whose power governs them 
and under whose order they live. Jurisdiction of this type of guilt rests with the 
power and will of the victor if the state was defeated militarily, or, again with the 
courts if this was a civil war situation. The failure to exercise political prudence to 
mitigate arbitrary use of power would be the charge. Then, there is the category 
of the moral guilt. It pertains to the actions of those who cannot act otherwise 
than as an individual. They are nonetheless deemed as morally responsible for 
all their deeds, including the execution of political and military orders. This text 
was written prior to Nuremberg and Eichmann Trials and Jaspers posited back 
than that its jurisdiction purely rests with one’s conscience, is retained within 
the community. Jaspers’ last category, that of metaphysical guilt, is the most 
troubling one and it also became a point of contention in his lengthy exchanges 
with Arendt during the post-War years. Accordingly, Jaspers assumes that there 
exists a solidarity among men as humans that makes each co-responsible for 
crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. 
This last point definitely merits further consideration in the context of 
collective responsibility debates. No doubt, its underlying assumption can easily 
lead to sanctimonious political moralism that has often been used to justify acts 
of vengeance and collective punishment. It may also lead to a conception of war 
as a crusade that requires unconditional surrender by the enemy and lead to 
unnecessary harm.39 For Jaspers metaphysical guilt results from confining our 
solidarity to the closest human ties -- family, friends, neighbors, ethno-religious 
38 See the English trasnlations as Karl Jaspers, The question of German guilt (Fordham University 
Press, 2009). This work was translated by E. B. Ashton and it was published in a series edited by 
John Caputo. The original version came out in German back in 1946 and the first English edition 
was published in 1947. See Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, Heidelberg: Schneider ([translated as, The 
Question of German Guilt, trans. E. B. Ashton] The Dial Press, 1947). 
39  See Hannah Arendt, et al. “Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Correspondence, 1926-1969.” (Harcourt 
Brace Jonakovich, 1992). 
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brethren, etc. – rather than extending it to all of humanity. It makes us suffer from 
lack of proportion in terms of judging our world and human value. In the end, 
Jaspers himself acknowledges that jurisdiction over metaphysical guilt lies with 
no court. Still, this easily abused concept reminds us of the myriad ways in which 
our lives are entangled with and may profit from the suffering of others. 
4. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE JASPERS ALTERNATIVE? 
Ascertaining litigation for crimes reaching the dimensions of what Jaspers had 
in mind is an elusive quest. This is despite the precedents set by post-WWII trials. 
Indeed, the trial of major Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg (1949) is considered 
a landmark event in the development of modern international law, and continues 
to be highly influential in our understanding of international criminal law and 
post-conflict justice.40 The plethora of essays and manuscripts written on the Trial, 
discussing key legal, political, and philosophical questions raised by the Trial both 
at the time and in historical perspective, are indicative of the crowned position the 
Trial occupies in legal history. Those involved in the Tribunal, the establishment 
of the Tribunal, the Trial process itself, and the debate that followed its’ judgment 
have all been subject to rigorous academic debate. Ranging from the contribution 
of Nuremberg to the substantive development of international criminal law, to 
the philosophical evaluation of legalism in post-conflict systems of justice, the 
persistent significance of Nuremberg is indeed worthy of attention across a range 
of academic disciplines.41 Examinations of the Nuremberg legacy in contemporary 
international criminal justice are already widely available. The reason why I include 
a discussion on the Nuremberg Trials in this article on collective responsibility is 
for a somewhat different reason.  Nuremberg Judgment is often counted as the 
benchmark in international law for the definition and adjudication of individual 
accountability for human rights abuses at a mass scale. In this sense, it did 
constitute a turning point in the context of legal doctrines concerning the nature 
of legal responsibility. However, as I will argue in the following paragraphs, this 
achievement did not alleviate Jaspers’ concern that for such crimes, the judgment 
cannot emanate from the courtroom alone. 
40 See Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling accounts: the duty to prosecute human rights violations of a 
prior regime” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537; Steven Ratner, Steven, Jason S. Abrams & James 
L. Bischoff Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg 
Legacy (Oxford University Press, 2009).
41 See Henry T. King Jr, “The Legacy of Nuremberg” (2002) 34 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 335; Christian 
Tomuschat, “The legacy of Nuremberg” (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 830, and, 
Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams & James L. Bischoff. Accountability for human rights atrocities in 
international law: beyond the Nuremberg legacy (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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During the Trial, the concept of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege has been put to 
the test of war crimes and despite a degree of inexactitude, both crimes against 
humanity and genocide have been retroactively codified as a result. These 
developments in adjudication of international crimes were then followed by 
the codification of slavery, forced labor, torture, forced disappearances, racial 
discrimination and apartheid as indictable crimes. In this sense, the Trial also 
redefined the notion of culpability in international law. It introduced significant 
changes in our understanding of individual criminal responsibility and despite 
statutes of limitations and the ‘reasonable time period’ clauses, it opened the path 
for reinstituting the threshold of legal requirements for individual accountability 
for mass crimes. Aside from its importance concerning the codification of societal 
and mass crimes in international law, however, Nuremberg Trial also forced us 
to address the problem of whether and on what basis a successor government 
must prosecute the human rights abuses of a prior regime. Contending that the 
rule of law and natural justice principles require that the very worst crimes be 
prosecuted no matter what the rank and status of the accused person(s) may 
be, Nuremberg judges proposed that principles of international law, both in its 
customary and conventional forms, impose a duty to investigate and prosecute 
in such extreme cases.42 This take on legality and judgment was then accepted 
as a foundational premise for future international courts.43 However, in terms of 
defenses available for the accused in international criminal law pertaining to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, for instance, the generic standardization of 
prosecutions in national courts as well as in international tribunals is causing 
increasing number problems with significant socio-political repercussions. 
The most important substantive defenses include superior orders, command 
responsibility, tu quoque as a subcategory of argumentum ad hominem, military 
necessity, proportionality, and reprisals. Jurisdictional defenses applicable in 
national tribunals include personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and 
double jeopardy. Then there is the issue of the location of the tribunal or the 
trial, the status of the presiding judge or judges and the legitimacy of the court 
producing the judgment.44 
42 See Aryeh Neier War crimes: Brutality, genocide, terror, and the struggle for justice. (Crown Pub-
lishing Group,1998).
43 See Cherif M. Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law, Volume 2 Multilateral and Bilateral En-
forcement Mechanisms (Brill, 2008); William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court (Cambridge University Press, 2011) and the standard text book by Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta, Laurel Baig, Mary Fan, and Christopher Gosnell, Cassese’s international criminal law (Oxford 
University Press, 2013).
44 James Meernik, “Victor’s Justice or the Law? Judging And Punishing At The International Criminal 
Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia” (2003) 47 Journal of Conflict Resolution 140; Victor Peskin, 
“Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Crimi-
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Furthremore, if we look at the victor’s justice argument posed about 
Nuremberg and Tokto trials from the point of view of the victims, it is possible to 
posit that although forgiveness is often taken to bear a close connection to societal 
reconciliation, there is a good deal of scepticism about its role in situations where 
there is no consensus on the moral complexion of the past and no clear admission 
of guilt on the part of the perpetrator. In other words, the conviction-oriented 
framework of these post-WWII Military Tribunals are indeed troubling for 
societal and political crimes. Forgiveness without perpetrator acknowledgement 
aggravates the risk of recidivism, yields a substandard and morally compromised 
form of political accommodation, and leads to the silencing and patronizing of 
the victims, therefore potentially causing further social and political alienation 
ad victimization. Guilt becomes inscribed to the collective memory of nations as 
a dividing line, but neither forgiveness nor true understanding emanates from 
litigation of such crimes alone.
5. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS AN EPICURIAN CURE FOR THE 
CONUNDRUMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW?
From Epicurus onwards, the notion of moral responsibility based on a moral 
agent’s causal ownership of his/her actions, as opposed to the agent’s ability to 
act or choose otherwise, has troubled legal thinking. This is indeed the crux of 
the matter that Frankfurt examples were built upon. It also relates to the puzzles 
surrounding Arendt’s take on the banality of evil and the possibility/impossibility 
of the punishment of the unforgiveable.  Epicurus considered it a necessary 
condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and 
not something else that brought the action about.45 Thus, the central question of 
moral responsibility was whether the agent was a cause of the action, or whether 
the moral agent was forced to act by some other force. Accordingly, actions are 
nal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” (2005) 4 Journal of Human Rights 213; Bill 
Wringe, “Why punish war crimes? Victor’s justice and expressive justifications of punishment” 
(2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 159; William A. Schabas, “Victor’s Justice: Selecting Situations at the 
International Criminal Court” (2009) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 535.
45 See Epicurus, The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments 
(Prometheus Books, 1993) This popular arrangement of fragments follows the outline set forth by C. 
Bailey’s 1926 collection on the thinker. One of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic period [the 
three centuries following the death of Aristotle in 323 B.C.E.], Epicurus developed an unsparingly 
materialistic and empiricist epistemology, and is known for his hedonistic ethics. He rejected 
the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial soul, and famously declared that gods have no 
influence on our lives. His’ gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and communities 
of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death. In Anglo-American philosophical traditions, 
Epicurean thought re-emerged primarily in the context of moral responsibility and intentionality. 
See Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability (Cornell University 
Press, 1988). 
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to be attributed to moral agents because it is in their actions that the agents, 
qua moral beings, manifest themselves. In this context, the question of moral 
engagement becomes all the more important.46 In his narration concerning how 
humans become moral beings, Epicurus envisaged a complex theory of moral 
responsibility and moral development, which could indeed find application in 
the area of collective responsibility and mass crimes. Epicurean ethics does not 
have the function of developing or justifying a moral system that allows for the 
effective allocation of praise and blame.47 Instead, it looks at the choices people 
make regardless of the system they are surrounded by.  On the issue of free will 
and moral responsibility, Harry Frankfurt’s argument that moral responsibility 
does not require the freedom to do otherwise, linked with the debate over 
whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept, indeed echoes 
the Epicurean call for deciphering individual agency in collective acts. Thus, the 
central question of moral responsibility becomes whether the agent was the 
cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to act. 
Some instances of wrongdoing are distinctly of a collective kind. When, for 
example, one group commits genocide against another, this is a collective act 
of crime in the sense that the wrongness of genocide is morally distinct from 
the aggregation of individual murders that make up the genocide. The problem, 
which I will refer to as the problem of collective wrongs, is that in traditional 
criminal law, how to assign blame for distinctly collective wrongdoing to 
individual contributors when at least some of those individual contributors are 
not directly guilty of the wrongdoing in question is habitually left unclear. I already 
offered Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle as a starting point for solving this 
particular problem, although the principle ought to be expanded to include a 
broader and more appropriate range of cases than Kutz initially intended. The 
46 Developing a core conception of moral responsibility, Epicurus’ writings pose the question of 
what human life without moral responsibility would be like. That exploration alone establishes 
that many robust forms of human relationship and situational normativity could continue, absent 
moral responsibility. However, accountability would become impossible. For a full debate on the 
Epicurean legacy concerning contemporary debates on moral responsibility, see Martin John 
Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2006). Fischer’s work 
is particularly relevant in its emphasis on the connections between deliberation and action, 
and, between free will, freedom of action, and moral responsibility/accountability. This frame of 
reference ties together responsibility for actions, omissions and consequences. 
47 On the issue of the allocation of moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective 
wrongdoings, see Kenton Machina, “Moral Responsibility—What is All the Fuss About?” (2007) 22 Acta Analytica 29; Neil Levy & Michael McKenna “Recent Work on Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility” (2009) 4 Philosophy Compass 96, and, M. Braham & M. van Hees “An Anatomy of 
Moral Responsibility” (2012) 121 Mind 601. Braham and van Hees’ work is particularly significant 
for the examination of the structure of moral responsibility in relation to outcomes. A central 
feature of their analysis is a condition that they term as the ‘avoidance potential’, which indicates 
that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. 
76 NERGIS CANEFE
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v.3 | n.1 | p. 53 - 89 | jan./jul. 2017
view I ultimately defend is that individuals are blameworthy for collective harms 
insofar as they knowingly participate in or collaborate in the committal of those 
harms, and that said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they 
succeed in making a causal contribution to those harms.48 
Another prominent political philosopher of the post-WWII era, Michael 
Bratman also made critical contributions to our understanding of the notion of 
intention and how it relates to action, in particular criminal action. In Bratman’s 
view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future 
conduct.  The commitment involved in intending, and its implications for our 
understanding of shared intention and shared cooperative activity, lead to a 
rich discussion on moral responsibility.49 In the context of philosophy of action 
and moral philosophy, issues about the nature of agency, intention and practical 
reason, free will and moral responsibility, and shared agency are indeed much 
more easily brought to the fore compared to the difficulties we may face with 
regard to discussing these in the context of philosophy of law. In this sense, 
Bratman’s work Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987) permanently 
altered the landscape of both the philosophy of action and the theory of practical 
rationality, by drawing our attention to the complex, constitutive roles that 
intention plays in human agency.50 In particular, his essays on shared agency are 
of utmost significance for the debate on collective responsibility.51 
If we accept Bratman’s description, the notion of collective responsibility would 
refer to both the causal responsibility of moral agents for harm in the world and 
the blameworthiness that we ascribe to them for having caused such harm. Hence, 
it would assume both a moral and a causal component. Criminal law associates 
causal responsibility and blameworthiness with groups only in rare cases such as 
48 On this issue, also see Brian Lawson, “Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing” (2013) 16 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 227.
49 See Michael Bratman, Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999)
50 What happens to our conception of the mind and of rational agency when we take future-directed 
intentions seriously? What is the role of intention as input for practical reasoning? Michael Bratman 
responded to these questions in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In his 
manuscript Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Bratman fully developed the main themes of the 
previous essays and proposed a full-fledged theory of intention. In this later work, intentions are 
treated as essential elements of plans of action. These plans play a basic role in practical reasoning, 
supporting the organization of our activities within a future oriented trajectory. Bratman’s work 
also explores the relationship between intention and intentional action, as well as the distinction 
between intended and expected effects of what one intends. All these issues are very critical for 
reaching a deeper understanding of collective responsibility. See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, 
and Practical Reason (University of Chicago Press, 1987).
51 Michael Bratman, Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together (Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
77MEA CULPA, SUA CULPA, TUA MAXIMA CULPA: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL JUDGMENT
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v.3 | n.1 | p. 53 - 89 | jan./jul. 2017
genocide and crimes against humanity, but for litigation purposes the line in the 
sand is always drawn at individual culpability. Criminal jurisprudence locates the 
source of moral responsibility in collective actions only if collectives were directly 
involved in these acts of harm.52 Here, I beg to differ from this commonplace 
referral to the notion of collective responsibility as derivative of an assumed group 
morality. I am also standing against the assumption that collective responsibility 
violates principles of individual responsibility and fairness concerning criminal 
attribution.  On the contrary, I propose that collective responsibility—as well as 
group intentions, collective action, and group blameworthiness—is a coherent 
construct and can be ascribed to moral agents fairly in cases of societal and political 
crimes. This attribution, however, does not have to be punitive in nature. 
My reservations about associating collective responsibility with group 
morality could perhaps be explicated in the context of the structure of the argument 
that was augmented by traditions of religious thought such as those found in the 
Old Testament (Tanakh) referring to the accounts of the Flood, the Tower of Babel 
or Sodom and Gomorrah as well as the New Testament blaming of Jews as an entire 
race for the killing of Jesus Christ.  In these narratives, entire communities were 
punished for their supposed deeds and to set an example for the rest of humanity. In 
Biblical narratives pertaining to the death of Jesus, for instance, the blame was cast 
not only on the Jews of the time but upon all future generations to come.  The core of 
these religious arguments relates to a desire for communal forms of punishment for 
collective harms.  No doubt, secular forms of this logic are equally widespread and 
troubling.  Post 9/11 trends of anti-Islamism and resultant public policy measures 
are a case in point that is all too familiar. Collective responsibility translated into a 
rationale for collective punishment is also regularly used as a disciplinary measure 
in military units, prisons, and psychiatric facilities used for political crimes such as 
those operated in Russia.53 Without fail, these measures breed distrust and desire 
for vengeance among the members of the punished group and their communities 
at large. These punishment schemes are also commonly practiced in situation 
of war based on the presupposition of collective guilt.  Collective guilt, or guilt 
by association, is a dangerous claim that assumes groups of humans can bear 
guilt above and beyond the guilt of individual members. Contemporary criminal 
law operates on the principle that guilt shall only be attributed to a legal person 
and not to a group or community. Keeping these intricacies and problem-laden 
52 For a debate on intergenerational collective responsibility, see Janna Thompson, (2006) 
“Collective Responsibility for Historic Injustices” (2006) 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 154.
53 See Melvyn Freeman & Soumitra Pathare. WHO resource book on mental health, human rights and 
legislation (World Health Organization, 2005) and Steven Fish, Democracy derailed in Russia: The 
failure of open politics (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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historical examples of attribution of collective guilt in mind, one must not equate 
collective responsibility either with collective punishment or collective assignment 
of presumed moral failure to groups, communities or societies. However, this 
precaution should not refrain us from seeking a substantive definition of collective 
responsibility for mass crimes. 
While the majority of debates on collective responsibility continue to 
deliberate on the very possibility of it, a select group of scholars ushered in two 
further concerns. The first has to do with whether groups could meet stringent 
conditions of moral responsibility that individuals do. Intentionality, as I touched 
upon briefly in the above paragraphs, becomes key in this context.  The second 
concern has to do with the advantages and disadvantages of holding particular 
kinds of groups such as communities or particular ethno-religious groups, or 
even states, morally responsible in response to harm caused by their direct or 
indirect actions.54 One key example to consider in this area is that of lustration. 
Often, after a regime-changing war, a state engages in lustration in order to secure 
the condemnation and punishment of dangerous, corrupt, or culpable members 
of the previous political system.  Changes in the political structure of post-
Apartheid South Africa, post-WWII de-Nazification of Germany or the recent de-
Ba’athification in Iraq are commonly referred cases of lustration. This common 
practice poses an important dilemma from the perspective of how to define and 
put into practice collective responsibility because even well planned, legally 
sound and nuanced lustration involves condemning groups of people.55 It also 
raises important questions about collective agency and rectification of historical 
injustices. While group treatment might be justified on grounds of convenience 
and political peace in times of transitional justice, there are also valid arguments 
consistent with due process requirements for wholesale group punishment.56
54 For instance, the proxy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have put front and center the problem of 
dealing with non-uniformed combatants. They also led to questions concerning the legitimacy of 
resorting to martial violence under such circumstances of quasi occupations. The location of the 
legal agency for attributing responsibility for righting the wrongs committed afterwards and who 
to turn to for that end remain as major issues, especially for the American military establishment. 
The specific problem of non-uniformed combatants and the general problem of justifying war are 
profoundly linked. War is but only one form of generalized collective violence. Collective violence 
poses a particular set of challenges to the application of moral and legal principles within the context 
of the traditional model of criminal responsibility. See Anna Stilz, “Collective responsibility and the 
state” (2011) 19 Journal of Political Philosophy 190, and, Christopher Kutz, “The difference uniforms 
make: collective violence in criminal law and war” (2015) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 148. 
55 This problem is discussed in detail in Avia Pasternak, “The collective responsibility of democratic 
publics” (2011) 41 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 99. The main reference used in this context 
is Hanna Pitkin’s work. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of 
California Press, 1967).
56 See Yvonne Chiu, “Liberal Lustration” (2011) 19 Journal of Political Philosophy 440. For a larger 
debate on war and justice, see Robert E. Williams & Dan Caldwell, “Jus post bellum: Just war theory 
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Concomitantly, I would like posit a theory of combined criminal and political 
accountability based on an understanding of collective action and collective 
responsibility that not only allows for but demands individual responsibility.57 In 
other words, instead of generalizing the sum total of individuals as a collective, 
the causation I propose implicates a movement from the collective back to the 
individual.  No doubt, there isn’t a single, simple and all-encompassing solution to 
the problem of the relationship between individual and collective responsibility 
for wrongdoing and harm.  The one component that obscures the fundamental 
requirement for responsibility ascriptions most is that of moral agency. Closer 
attention to matters of individual and collective agency may provide a defensible 
criterion for establishing when an individual is and isn’t responsible for the 
untoward consequences of a collective act.58 For instance, not only individuals 
but organizations and institutions can act and exercise power and thus could be 
deemed as accountable for harm. This is possible because they possess decision-
making structures that are formal. As such, they could be deemed as ‘legal persons’. 
The actions of such legal actors are not reducible to the actions of its individual 
members. Since these legal actors/agents could have acted differently or could 
have been re-organized to change the course of their harmful acts, they could be 
deemed as morally responsible for the untoward effects of the power they exercise 
to the larger population.  Thus, at least in principle, they are blameworthy and could 
be subject to legal judgments.  The ability to exercise power purposely, knowingly 
as opposed to recklessly, or negligently, reveal a particular disposition to abusing 
power since it is concentrated and institutionalized.  Furthermore, I would argue 
that such legal actors’ disposition is not reducible to the dispositions or degrees of 
and the principles of just peace” (2006) 7 International Studies Perspectives 309; Jens Meierhenrich, 
«The ethics of lustration» (2006) 20 Ethics & International Affairs 99; Darrel Mollendorf, “Jus ex 
bello” (2008) 16 Journal of Political Philosophy 123; Mark Evans, «Moral responsibilities and the 
conflicting demands of jus post bellum» (2009) 23 Ethics & International Affairs 147; Anatoly 
Levshin, «Jus Contra Bellum in the Modern States System: Observations on the Anomalous Origins 
of the Crime of Aggressive War» (2015) 10 St Antony’s International Review 141.
57 See Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 
2007)
58 Albert Flores & Deborah G. Johnson, “Collective responsibility and professional roles” (1983) 93 
Ethics 537. This is a very interesting debate on the responsibilities of ‘the peg in the cog’, i.e. indi-
viduals working as part of large institutions and organization and towards a cumulative end result. 
The authors reach the conclusion that collective responsibility cannot be appropriated to individ-
uals in such situations. Rather, it should be the specific individuals and offices that provide the 
overall design and goals of the organization and determine the distribution of duties that should 
be held responsible from erroneous acts of such organized bodies. For a counter argument on this 
issue, see W. H. Walsh, “Pride, shame and responsibility” (1970) 20 The Philosophical Quarterly 1. 
Also see Virginia Held, “Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible?” (1970) 67 
Journal of Philosophy 471. For Held, the crux of the matter lies at the defining characteristics of a 
‘collectivity’ and how they reach decisions that lead to harm. She takes a strong position against 
‘methodological individualism’, which I share full-heartedly. 
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blame of the individual members who participated in the internal decision-making 
processes or even those who led these organizations and institutions. Instead, 
there is a need for a larger discussion on the interdependent relationship between 
the individual and the collective in upholding a system of abuse, harm and danger. 
Here, the Epicurean cure for the conundrums of the debate on moral responsibility 
comes to our rescue as the foreground allowing us to think about intentionality 
and causal involvement in collective acts, and as a call for assuming responsibility 
for our own decisions to act or not to act. 
6. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
BLAMEWORTHINESS
Whether collective responsibility makes sense as a non-distributive 
phenomenon, that is to say whether it transcends the contributions of particular 
group members, is a debate that remains pivotal for legal theory. In this context, 
two claims are crucial. The first is that groups, unlike individuals, cannot be 
accountable for intentions and hence cannot act or cause harm qua groups. 
The second is that groups, as distinct from their individual members, cannot be 
understood as morally blameworthy according to the criteria required by moral 
responsibility argument. Accordingly, we cannot isolate genuinely collective 
actions, as distinct from identical actions of many persons, and groups, unlike 
the individuals who belong to them, cannot formulate intentions of the kind 
thought to be necessary to actions. Here, the main worry is about the fairness of 
ascribing collective responsibility to individuals who do not themselves directly 
cause harm or who do not bring about harm purposefully.59
If group intention is a necessary condition of attributing collective 
responsibility, the question then becomes how to ascertain it.60 In this context, 
collective behaviors are separated from collective actions, the latter arguably 
caused by the beliefs, desires and wants of the collective itself.  As such, moral 
59 See Steven Sverdlik, “Collective Responsibility” (1987) 51 Philosophical Studies 61. For him, 
moral blameworthiness requires the existence of bad intentions—or at least moral faultiness—on 
the part of those being held responsible. Otherwise, one cannot seek criminality. On this issue, 
also see Seumas Miller, “Collective responsibility” (2001) 15 Public Affairs Quarterly 65 and Jan 
Narveson, “Collective responsibility” (2002) 6 The Journal of Ethics 179.  Miller’s emphasis is typical 
of the traditional criminal law take on collective responsibility. He underlines joint actions rather 
than omissions and complicity that cause grave harm. He also makes a clear distinction between 
retrospective and prospective responsibility, an issue best attended in the context of debates on 
restorative justice. 
60 See Angelo J. Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment. Vol. 9. (Springer, 2009). For Corlett, collective 
intentionality is a required condition to ascertain collective liability.  In this vein, he also argues 
that collective responsibility could only be ascertained if there was collective voluntariness and if 
we could identify a corporate moral agency for wrongdoing and harm. 
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blameworthiness is grounded in the bad intentions of moral agents who cause 
harm in defining both individual and collective responsibility. If so, how groups, 
as distinct from their individual members, could have bad intentions and 
demonstrate the ability to act on them? Could entire communities be deemed 
as appropriate bearers of moral blameworthiness, guilt, or shame? Critics of the 
collective responsibility argument concentrate on showing either that, actions 
are associated exclusively with individuals, not groups or communities, or 
that groups cannot make choices or hold beliefs in the sense required by the 
formulation of intentions as defined by criminal law.61 Meanwhile, these same 
critics pay much less attention to the nature of collective actions. It may be true 
that collectivities may not have moral faults, since they don’t make moral choices 
in the way that is commonly understood. And yet, does that by default mean they 
cannot properly be ascribed moral responsibility for their harmful actions that 
are only possible if and when individuals act collectively?
At the other end of the spectrum, defenders of collective responsibility 
argument feel propelled to justify both the moral possibility of collective 
responsibility and the coherence of collective responsibility as a moral, and hence 
possibly legal, construct. To start with, precepts of methodological individualism 
are brought under attack.62 Accordingly, the collective blame that we ascribe 
in mass crimes cannot be realized in terms of individual blameworthiness. 
Furthermore, as exemplified by Larry May’s work, there is a class of predicates 
that can only be true of collectives. May uses the relational theory of Jean-
Paul Sartre to argue that groups can legitimately be ascribed actions in cases 
where individuals act together in a manner that would not be possible if they 
acted alone.63 On the issue of group intentions, however, the legal problem of 
ascertaining intentionality is not easy to tackle and it remains a threshold issue 
for criminal law related determinations. If intentions play a fundamental role in 
an agent’s practical deliberation and volition, the prospect of a shared intention 
introduces the specter of shared mental states. That is not included in the 
standards of proof for criminal law litigation. 
61 See, for instance, the classical work of Hywel D. Lewis, “Collective responsibility” (1948) 23 
Philosophy 3 as well as David E. Cooper, “Collective responsibility” (1968) 43 Philosophy 258, and 
Robert Silcock Downie, “Collective responsibility” (1969) 44  Philosophy 66.
62 See David E. Cooper, “Collective Responsibility” (1968) 43 Philosophy 258 and Howard McGary, 
“Morality and Collective Liability” (1986) 20 The Journal of Value Inquiry 157. Peter French’s work 
on corporations is particularly useful in this context. See Peter A. French, “The Corporation as a 
Moral Person” (1979) 16 American Philosophical Quarterly 207. Interestingly, this debate dates 
back to late 1970s, way before the post-Marxist legal critiques of international public law. 
63 See Larry May The Morality of Groups (University of Notre Dame Press, 1989) and Larry May & 
Stacey Hoffman, eds. Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied 
Ethics (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992)
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In other words, if the possibility of collective responsibility supposedly 
requires a collective mind, we might as well give up on the notion of collective 
responsibility altogether. Groups can legitimately be said to have shared beliefs 
and convictions. And yet, this is quite distinct from the proposition of a collective 
mind-set. These convictions are otherwise known as institutional culture, 
ideology, political movements etc. Hence, looking for a collective mind-set for 
ascertaining collective responsibility for societal harm and wrongdoings is not 
the business of criminal justice litigation.64 In Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller’s 
work, these factors are named as ‘we intentions’ and they provide the springboard 
for joint commitments and actions.65 Furthermore, according to Tuomela, 
actions by collectives build upon the actions of the operative members of the 
collective in such a way that the properties of collectives, such as their intentions, 
beliefs, and desires, are both embodied and determined by the perspectives of 
individual members or representatives of the collective in question. This is an 
unusual intervention with very important implications for the production of 
legal judgments concerning collective wrongs.  Indeed, May offers one of the 
most interesting arguments of this sort in his defense of collective moral agency. 
Although he rejects accounts of group intentions that are tied to Kantian notions 
of moral agency, he reformulates group intentions with reference to a theory of 
interdependence and sociality.
Historically, for those who work on collective responsibility as a necessary 
notion for applied philosophy, ethics, and legal theory, the focus has been on 
nations, corporations, and other groups that have an institutional backbone 
and well-ordered decision-making procedures in place. Organizational and 
institutional mechanisms through which courses of concerted action have been 
decided upon and justified as rule-bound are deemed particularly important. 
Similarly, enforced standards of conduct for individuals that are stringent and 
disciplinarian constitute an important aspect of such forms of action. In turn, 
purposeful, planned and institutionally controlled actions could render groups 
64 According to both Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman, the keyword is joint commitment. In 
other words, group intentions exist when two or more persons constitute the plural subject of an 
intention to carry out a particular action.  See Margaret Gilbert “Modelling collective belief” (1987) 
73 Synthese 185; Margaret Gilbert, Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation (Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and responsibility: New essays in plural 
subject theory (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Margaret Gilbert “Shared intention and 
personal intentions” (2009) 144 Philosophical studies 167. Bratman’s most relevant work in 
the context of shared intention and mutual obligations is his Faces of intention: Selected essays 
on intention and agency (Cambridge University Press, 1999).  Also see David J. Velleman, J. David 
“What happens when someone acts?” (1992) 101 Mind 461. 
65 See Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller “We-intentions” (1988) 53 Philosophical Studies 367. Also 
see Raimo Tuomela, “We-intentions revisited” (2005) 125 Philosophical Studies 327 and Raimo 
Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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and communities collectively responsible for harm caused by their joint acts, 
though most likely not in a criminal sense. In the case of social and political 
movements, as discussed in detail by Joel Feinberg and his body of work on 
collective responsibility, there is the added element of ideological directives and 
resultant group solidarity leading individuals to pursue projects together as a 
collective agent.66 All of these are aspects of a very germane debate on collective 
responsibility that has been thus far overlooked by theories of international 
criminal law pertaining to mass crimes, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
This is a deep chasm that must be addressed without further ado, if not directly 
in the area of criminal law then in legal theory pertaining to criminal law.  
7. CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA OF THE SUM TOTAL VERSUS ITS 
CONSTITUTIVE PARTS
Since collective responsibility refers to the addressing of widespread harm 
and wrongdoing associated with the actions of collectivities, groups, societies and 
institutional bodies, the key components of its adjudication are directly related 
to constitutive aspects of social, cultural and political life in general.  While there 
is a broad, often tacit, agreement regarding the basic model of moral and criminal 
responsibility when it is applied to individuals, as we have seen thus far, there 
is considerable moral and legal doubt about how this notion might be applied 
to collectivities and their members at large. First and foremost, adjudication of 
collective responsibility leads to a disagreement about the very conception of 
collective responsibility.67 One version maintains that only individual human 
agents can be held morally and criminally responsible for harmful acts, and 
while another conceptions insists that groups, collectivities and institutions can 
be held morally and criminally responsible as collectivities, independently of 
their members’ individual actions.  The former conception has, as its departure 
66 See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton 
University Press, 1970). In his later treatise Moral Limits of Criminal Law, Feinberg focuses on the 
relationship between interests and wants, and makes a distinction between want-regarding and 
ideal-regarding analyses of interests. In particular, he focuses on hard cases for the applications of 
the concept of harm. Examples of the “hard cases” Feinberg uses are harm to character, vicarious 
harm, and prenatal and posthumous harm. Feinberg also discusses the relationship between harm 
and rights, the concept of a victim, and the distinctions of various quantitative dimensions of harm, 
consent, and offense, including the magnitude, probability, risk, as well as the importance of harm 
for both the individual and the society at large. See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford University Press, 1984).  
67 The main texts I refer to in this regard are again those pertaining to the Arendt-Jaspers 
correspondence. Also see Hannah Arendt, German guilt (Jewish Frontier Association, 1945); Karl 
Jaspers, The question of German guilt (Fordham University Press, 2009) and his The Origin and Goal 
of History (Routledge Revivals Series, Routledge, 2014).
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point, the conviction that collectivities and institutions are capable of actions 
that cannot be reduced to the actions and interests of their individual members.68 
And yet, this belief or conviction alone does not render adjudication of collective 
responsibility a straightforward process. 
In this context, Joel Feinberg’s taxonomy of collective responsibility 
arrangements constitutes a critical contribution to the exploration of issues 
regarding the culpability of collectives and their members.  In his classical 
treatise written back in 1970, Doing and Deserving, Feinberg presents four 
distinct responsibility arrangements: (a) “Whole groups can be held liable even 
though not all of their members are at fault...” (b) “A group can be held collectively 
responsible through the fault, contributory or noncontributory, of each member” 
(c) “Group liability [could be attributed] through the contributory faults of each 
and every member” and (d) “Through the collective…fault of the group itself [the 
collective] bears liability independently of its members.”69 If we are to consider 
each of Feinberg’s constructs in order to reach a conclusion pertaining to the 
justiciability of collective acts leading to harm, the following complications need 
to be adequately addressed.70  
68 See  Carl Wellman, A Theory of Rights: Persons under Laws, Institutions and Morals (Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1985); Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations a Legal Theory for Bureaucratic 
Society (University of California Press, 1986) and Allen Buchanan, “Toward a Theory of the Ethics of 
Bureaucratic Organizations” (1996) 6 Business Ethics Quarterly 419. These essays articulate a crucial 
and neglected element of pertaining to the general theory of ethics of bureaucratic organizations, in 
both private and public realms. The key to the approach developed here is the thesis that distinctive 
ethical principles must be applicable to bureaucratic organizations due to their aggregate power-
holding status. This arises from the nature of bureaucratic organizations as complex webs of 
principal/agent relations that cannot be reduced to individual actions within that realm. 
69 In his treatise Doing and Deserving, Feinberg covers the following notions that are most pertinent to 
the current debate on collective responsibility: Supererogation and rules, problematic responsibility in 
law and morals, justice and personal desert, sua culpa and collective responsibility. See Joel Feinberg, 
Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1970). Also see his The Moral Limits 
of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1984). This latter work is the first volume in a four-
volume series entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question of what acts 
the state may rightly render as criminal. Here, Feinberg identifies four liberty-limiting or coercion-
legitimizing principles, each of which is the subject of a separate volume. In the first volume on the 
Moral Limits, he looks at the principle of harm to others, which John Stuart Mill identified as the only 
liberty-limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) 
the offense principle--it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) 
legal paternalism--it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism--it is 
necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. Feinberg himself rejects legal 
paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust 
the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg’s examination of the harm 
principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, 
wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. He considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent 
harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms. These discussions are 
essential for developing a robust legally applicable understanding of collective responsibility. 70 Justiciability is a key concept especially for constitutional and international law due to the fact 
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In Feinberg’s first case, if a whole group is liable for the faulty and harmful 
actions of one or several members of the group, there must be the accompanying 
assumption that this sort of collectivity possesses a significant degree of solidarity. 
No doubt, this presumption stands against the ideal of individual responsibility 
and autonomy.  Punishment of all for the wrongdoing of a few is not customarily 
defensible on moral or legal grounds. For both goods and harms to be defined as 
collective and shared, would promotion of a mutual sense of collective destiny 
suffice? Looked at through the lens of justiciability, the answer is negative.  Courts 
often invoke one of the justiciability doctrines - standing, ripeness, and mootness - 
to bring potentially important public litigation to a definite conclusion. According 
to orthodox understanding of justiciability, these doctrines disempower courts 
from deciding certain kinds of cases. Of the three, mootness doctrine is the most 
relevant for our purposes as it has the strongest moral moorings in terms of law’s 
compass in society. Collectives are not punishable where individual autonomy is 
held as a supreme value in the constitutional order. Furthermore, constitutional 
schemes often create a presumption in favor of preserving a degree of legislative 
control over jurisdiction. In the case of collective responsibility, courts would 
need to transform mootness from a constitutional doctrine into a prudential 
doctrine that would enable them to decide otherwise ‘moot cases’ whenever a 
decision would help give true and concrete meaning to important public values. 
That is, however, an idealistic future projection rather than the present day 
reality of litigation for societal and political crimes.
Furthermore, in a standard criminal law setting, arrangements in which 
the whole group is punished for the faults or wrongdoing of a few constitute 
vicarious liability, and a person punished on account of another’s wrongdoing is 
said to have been punished vicariously. Vicarious liability squarely conflicts with 
individual moral responsibility.71 For litigation purposes, such an attribution of 
group or collective liability is an arrangement that is unsuitable for most forms of 
harm or wrongdoing.72 However, the issue is not so clear when we are dealing with 
actions of the state institutions for instance. In this changed setting, Feinberg’s 
second collective responsibility arrangement comes into the picture, which is 
that it pertains to the determination of the limits posed upon legal issues over which a given court 
can exercise its judicial authority. It includes the legal concept of standing, which is commonly 
used to determine if the party bringing a legal suit is a party appropriate for establishing whether 
an actual adversarial act or issue exists. Essentially, justiciability seeks to address whether a court 
possesses the ability to provide adequate resolution of a disputed matter.  Where a court feels it 
cannot offer such a final determination, the matter is rendered ‘not justiciable.’71 This is despite the fact that Christian teachings interpret Jesus’ crucifixion as his vicarious pun-
ishment for the sins of all humankind. 72 See Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
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based on the examination of implications for a group of individuals sharing a 
common agenda or could have possibly engaged in a similar harmful act. In this 
changed context, the ascription of criminal or moral responsibility requires that 
an act causing harm has actually occurred.73  
To conclude, as I have discussed thus far, legal-philosophical debates in the 
field of collective responsibility clearly prove that an exaggerated conception of 
fault and responsibility could easily lead to the ascription of blameworthiness 
to groups and communities without having a solid ground for justiciability. This 
is clearly observable in Feinberg’s categorizations, which constitute one of the 
finest examples of the legal philosophical analysis of collective responsibility. If 
so, formal organizations, such as business corporations, nation-states, armies 
or public bureaucracies appear to be the only legal actors that we could accrue 
justiciable forms of collective responsibility. That locks us back into the problem 
of responsibility being allocated only to formal units and their representatives 
thereof, and leaves us astray about societal accountability for mass political 
crimes. 
Whether a true and systemic rectification of injury and harm aiming for 
corrective justice is at all possible concerning mass political crimes thus remains as 
a very troubling question. By whom justice must be performed is where almost all 
the attention seems to have focused on so far. If the injuries in question are divided 
into components of harm and wrong, each component’s rectification would have 
to be considered separately. Although pecuniary compensation for such harms is 
practically plausible, money cannot act as a mediator between severely damaged 
lives and abusers of political power. Not all harms could be compensated, nor can it 
73 An interesting case on the issue of vicarious liability is that of  Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 AC 215. 
In this case, the House of Lords reformed the law on vicarious liability, in the context of a claim aris-
ing over the intentional infliction of harm, by introducing the ‘close connection’ test. The immediate 
catalyst was the desire to facilitate recovery of damages on the part of victims of child abuse. The 
precise form the revision assumed was derived from two Canadian Supreme Court cases: Bazley v 
Curry [1999] 174 DLR (4th) 45 and Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 174 DLR (4th) 7. Compared with other 
common law practices, Canadian jurisprudence contains a detailed review of the policy factors un-
derpinning the law of vicarious liability and expresses the view that the most significant of these is 
‘enterprise liability’. See Douglas Brodie, “Enterprise Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability” (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 493. On the larger issue of permissibility to harm others and re-
lated legal liabilities, see Charlie Webb, “What is Unjust Enrichment?” (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 215; Victor Tadros, “Duty and Liability” (2012) 24 Utilitas 259, and, Joanna Mary Firth 
& Jonathan Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability and Defensive Harm” (2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 
673. The last two articles build upon Jeff McMahan’s work on justified killing at times of war, which 
sets out a number of conditions for a person to be liable to attack, provided the attack is used to avert 
an objectively unjust threat defined in the following terms: (1) The threat, if realized, will wrongfully 
harm another; (2) the person is responsible for creating the threat; (3) killing the person is necessary 
to avert the threat, and (4) killing the person is a proportionate response to the threat. See Jeff McMa-
han, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford University Press, 2002).
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be said when compensation is paid, the status quo ante should be restored. There is 
no normative or conceptual reason for compensation to remedy societal harms. On 
the issue of the wrong, on the other hand, standard methods of rectification may 
or may not work, depending on the specific context of the injustice in question. 
For instance, to correct the wrongdoing by rectifying the harm may not at all 
be possible in the event of mass civilian deaths and disappearances. Deploying 
punitive damages may not be of much benefit for thousands or millions of displaced 
populations, either. The third, most common option embraced by international 
criminal law, punishment, also remains by and large symbolic. There may well be 
a need for an admission of causal and moral responsibility, public and institutional 
repudiation of the criminal act, substantive reforms at the state level, and, in some 
cases, disgorgement and reparations to be performed as a sign of a good faith effort 
to share the burden of the victims’ suffering by the society at large. Although these 
cannot be coerced onto members of the society, the state and its institutions are 
obligated to take an institutional lead in this regard. 
In this vein, this article offered a refutation of the litigation-heavy focus of 
international criminal law as it has been applied to mass societal and political 
crimes. Instead, it embraced the view that if so used, criminal law essentially 
becomes a stunted system of corrective rather than restorative justice.  The 
concept of corrective justice is neither capable of offering solutions to society-
wide problems nor is it poised to deliver restorative justice for historical wrong 
doings. Rather than being corrective, what is required in instances such as crimes 
against humanity is an essentially protective function. The aim is the protection 
of legal subjects and valuable social interests from such harms in future. Here, 
I also tried to address the question of whether a statute of limitations on a 
historical injustice is morally justified.  In essence, rectificatory justice calls 
for the ascription of a right to ask for rectification once an injustice has been 
perpetrated, without reference to a set time frame.  To claim a statute of limitations 
on historical injustices amounts to inserting a temporal limit on the legitimacy of 
rights to rectification--a set amount of time following injustice after which claims 
of rectification could no longer be considered valid. However, since ascribing a 
right to rectification for an injustice is a requirement of fundamental justice, 
and since the temporal limit called for by a statute of limitations on injustice is a 
constraint on that requirement, the idea of a statute of limitations on historical 
injustices is morally justified only if one has substantive reasons for accepting 
this constraint such as establishment and maintenance of societal peace. 
As a footnote to this entire debate, in legal philosophy, there is a peculiar 
argument that has been widely applied to substantiate the validity of claims for 
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historic justice. It is known as the “non-identity argument”.74 Accordingly, the harm 
to descendants of historically wronged peoples could be explained away not as 
deriving from the historic wrongs but from the failure to provide rectification 
to the previous generation for the harm they suffered. In this chain of injustices, 
each failure to provide rectification becomes the source of wrongful harm to the 
next. Non-identity philosophers argue that such chains form a bridge between the 
historic wrong and the harm suffered by living individuals today. In other words, 
past wrongs, for which original wrongdoers are responsible, harm descendants 
of original victims. Still, how do we distinguish claims of descendants of historic 
victims and claims made by others with unrelated interests in the rectification of 
the previous generation? A supplementary solution may be offered in the form 
of focusing on group harm and group membership. This approach ties individual 
harm to group harm rather than limiting justice claims to individual restitution or 
compensation. For instance, did slavery not harm the descendants of slaves? This 
is the classical example proving the shortcomings of the individual responsibility 
argument applied to reject the validity of claims for historic justice based on 
harms to descendants of victims of historic wrongs. According to the individual 
responsibility argument, if descendants are never harmed directly and personally 
by historic wrongs, they have no right to ask for rectification. This conclusion may 
be legally sound but it is morally unintuitive and must be debunked. 
To end, due to the extensive the nature of harm involved in historic 
injustices, one must try in earnest to overcome the hurdle posed by the 
individual responsibility argument waged against historic justice claims. 
Historic injustices and the harms they generate are best understood as group 
or collective harms. The response to group harms has to have a collective 
component as well, because the remedies offered are again only meaningful in 
a social and political context. Claims for justice under such circumstances have 
to be grounded in harms currently suffered by living individuals as a function of 
the harms their group or community were subject to as part of historic wrongs. 
One common form of such harm, constitutive harm, significantly differs from 
the aggregative accounts of harm generally used by standard individual criminal 
litigation processes. Constitutive harm could not be addressed in that limited 
context at all. It is the type of harm people suffer as members of historically 
74 The non-identity problem emerged as a lively ethical debate concerning our obligations to future 
generations during the 1970s. It figured strongly in the works of Derek Parfit, Thomas Schwartz 
and Robert M. Adams. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and persons. (Oxford University Press, 1984); 
James Woodward, “The non-identity problem” (1986) 96 Ethics 804; Doran Smolkin, “The Non-
Identity Problem and the Appeal to Future People’s Rights” (1994) 32 The Southern journal of phi-
losophy 315; Derek Parfit & Samuel Scheffler. On what matters: volume one. Vol. 1. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011).
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wronged groups and communities. Therefore, historic injustice cases require a 
different account of responsibility, one that cannot be harnessed solely based 
on individual responsibility argumentation within the context of criminal justice 
jurisprudence. With all the reservations carefully examined in this article, we 
must make room for considerations pertaining to collective responsibility as 
a moral obligation, providing a context within which legal judgment should be 
firmly situated, though itself not catapulted to being a criminal charge.
